Last week, Oklahoma approved a plan requiring schools to collect immigration status data from enrolling students, reviving a constitutional debate many believed was settled decades ago. While state officials claim the policy is purely for data collection, its timing–coinciding with announced plans to collaborate with federal immigration enforcement–raises serious concerns. This information could potentially be used to facilitate deportations or, more immediately, create barriers to school enrollment, posing a direct threat to the educational rights of undocumented children.
The consequences of this policy reach far beyond Oklahoma’s borders, potentially undermining the protections established in Plyler v. Doe (1982),1 where the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot deny public education based on immigration status. That landmark decision was rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no state shall “deny any person within its jurisdiction” equal protection of the laws—language that applies to all “persons,” regardless of citizenship status. The Court recognized that barring children from education due to their immigration status—something they have no control over—would create a permanent underclass, a reality fundamentally at odds with constitutional principles. In today’s knowledge-driven economy, where education is more critical than ever, the urgency of this concern has only intensified.
As states increasingly introduce policies that push the boundaries of Plyler, boundaries, courts nationwide must confront new legal questions about what constitutes an unconstitutional barrier to public education. The intersection of immigration enforcement, education access, and states’ rights presents complex constitutional challenges that extend well beyond enrollment policies. Assessing how these issues might withstand judicial scrutiny requires a careful analysis of Plyler‘s core principles alongside the evolving legal landscape that shapes today’s debates.
Plyler v. Doe: Historical foundation and constitutional principles
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Plyler that states cannot deny undocumented children access to K-12 public education. In that case, a group of undocumented children challenged a Texas statute that allowed local school districts to deny enrollment to children who were not “legally admitted” to the United States and withheld state funds for their education.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the Texas law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. First, the Court interpreted the phrase “person within its jurisdiction” under the Equal Protection Clause to apply to all individuals within a state’s territorial boundaries who are subject to its laws, including undocumented children. This interpretation is reinforced by legislative history, which shows that Congress deliberately used broad language to protect undocumented populations and to eliminate caste-based legislation.
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that while education is not a fundamental right, it is vital for sustaining democratic institutions and fostering economic productivity. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that denying public education to undocumented children would create a permanent underclass fundamentally at odds with American democratic principles. Given that these children have no control over their immigration status, the Court emphasized that they should not be penalized for their parents’ actions.
The Court rejected Texas’s justification for protecting state resources, emphasizing that the state failed to demonstrate that (1) undocumented children imposed a greater burden on schools than U.S. citizens or legally residing students, or that (2) excluding undocumented children would improve educational quality. Additionally, the Court dismissed the state’s concern that investing in the education of undocumented children would be futile if they later left the district, noting that many ultimately become legal residents or citizens. Instead, the Court argued that denying education would create a permanent underclass, exacerbating social problems rather than alleviating them.
Contemporary challenges to the Plyler precedent: State-level developments and 2025 outlook
In recent years, we have seen a surge in state-level initiatives targeting immigrant communities. The Supreme Court has also demonstrated an increasing willingness to overturn established precedent under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This evolving legal landscape has emboldened organizations to advocate for policies that challenge Plyler, including efforts to impose state tuition requirements on undocumented children in public schools, threatening the accessibility of education for vulnerable populations.
States are increasingly devising new strategies to challenge Plyler’s protections through indirect means that create practical barriers to public education access. Several key developments across different states illustrate this trend:
- Oklahoma Data Collection: The Oklahoma State Board of Education approved a plan in January 2025 requiring schools to request proof of citizenship or immigration status from families enrolling children in public schools. While the rule would not explicitly prevent undocumented students from enrolling, it requires districts to track and report students whose families have not provided proof of legal status. State Superintendent Ryan Walters stated the policy aims to help “assess statewide and local educational needs,” while simultaneously announcing intentions to work with federal immigration enforcement “in any way they see fit.” The plan will now move to the state legislature for review.
This approach closely mirrors a 2021 Alabama law that was struck down in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v, Gov. of Alabama (2012).3 There, the Eleventh Circuit found that requiring schools to collect immigration status data violated the Equal Protection Clause by significantly deterring enrollment and attendance of undocumented children. The court rejected Alabama’s argument that it merely sought to collect data, finding the requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on undocumented children’s educational rights without serving any substantial state interest.
Perhaps aiming to illustrate that circumstances have changed since the 1982 Plyler decision–where Texas failed to demonstrate a “significant burden” on the state’s economy from educating undocumented children–Oklahoma education officials have begun collecting data on the costs of educating these. students. State Superintendent Ryan Walters has cited an estimated $450 million burden on taxpayers, signaling a potential effort to justify new restrictions on access to public education for undocumented children.
No evidence supports this figure, nor has the superintendent provided the methodology used to calculate it. Understanding the extent of federal support and undocumented immigrant tax contributions made to public education is an important component of this calculation and could prove pivotal in 2025, encouraging other states to follow suit. However, given the Eleventh Circuit precedent and Plyler’s core protection against policies that deter undocumented children from accessing public education, Oklahoma’s new rule is likely to face substantial legal challenges. - Massachusetts Enrollment Barriers: In 2023, the Saugus Public School Committee in Massachusetts implemented an admissions policy that imposes unnecessary barriers on immigrant families through strict enrollment requirements, including mandatory census forms and threats of civil fines and criminal penalties. Similar to Oklahoma’s recent policy discussed above, this approach appears to conflict with established legal precedent protecting undocumented students’ access to public education. As demonstrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Hispanic Interest Coalition, documentation requirements that effectively deter undocumented children from enrolling in school face significant constitutional hurdles under the Equal Protection Clause.
In September 2024, two civil rights organizations filed a complaint in Essex Superior Court Wednesday against the town, the school district, and the Saugus School Committee. This case will likely serve as a crucial litmus test in 2025 for the viability of similar policies nationwide. - Tennessee Selective Voucher Program: In this legislative session, the Tennessee legislature is expected to prioritize the Education Freedom Act, proposing a school voucher program only available to students with proof of legal U.S. residency. While the Supreme Court has consistently protected access to public education under Plyler, it has drawn important distinctions regarding ancillary educational services. In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools (1988),4 the Court declined to extend Plyler’s heightened scrutiny to a challenge against school bus fees, distinguishing between the outright denial of public education and charging for optional transportation services.
The legal implications of Tennessee’s proposal remain uncertain in light of existing precedents. By tying voucher program eligibility to immigration status, the state raises an unresolved question under Plyler. Proponents may argue that the program supplements rather than restricts access to public education, but in practice, it could create a two-tiered system—the very outcome Plyler sought to prevent. If enacted in 2025, this approach could establish a troubling precedent, potentially allowing school choice programs to undermine Plyler’s protections while maintaining the appearance of basic public school access. - Texas Call for Overturning Plyler: In 2022, Texas Governor Greg Abbott explicitly called for Plyler’s reversal, citing “extraordinary expenses” while disregarding the documented economic and tax contributions of undocumented immigrants. This argument mirrors Texas’s failed position in Plyler, where the Court explicitly rejected fiscal concerns as insufficient to override constitutional protections. As Justice Brennan emphasized, the state failed to establish either a substantial state interest in excluding undocumented children or evidence that they posed a unique burden on school finances.
That same year, the Texas Senate’s attempted legislation to block undocumented children from receiving state education funds directly parallels both the law struck down in Plyler and similar measures rejected in subsequent cases like Horton v. Marshall Public Schools (1985)5 and Hispanic Interest Coalition. If Texas revives this legislation in 2025, it will face immediate legal challenges, as the Supreme Court expressly rejected state funding restrictions as a constitutionally impermissible method of deterring undocumented immigration, noting that legislation punishing children for their parents’ status “does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.”
These state-level initiatives signal a broader shift in the political and legal landscape surrounding undocumented children’s access to public education. As more states pursue policies that challenge or circumvent Plyler‘s protections, 2025 could become a pivotal year in determining whether the ruling’s guarantee of public education for undocumented children is upheld or gradually weakened through a patchwork of state restrictions and federal court battles.
The path forward
Oklahoma’s January 2025 policy is more than just another state-level challenge to Plyler—it marks a potential turning point in the decades-long protection of undocumented children’s access to public education. As courts grapple with these new challenges, the fundamental question remains: Will the United States uphold its constitutional commitment to educating all children within its borders, regardless of immigration status? The stakes are even higher today than in 1982, as education plays an increasingly vital role in economic and social mobility in our knowledge-based economy.
Footnotes
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). ↩︎
- See, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (overturning abortion protections guaranteed under Roe v. Wade (1973)); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (ending race-conscious school admissions). ↩︎
- Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v, Gov. of Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). ↩︎
- Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). ↩︎
- 769 F.2d 1323, 1333 (8th Cir. 1985). ↩︎